Since 04-17-05
Why We Almost Lost the Submarine SSN-711
Since 04-17-05
From Soldiers for the Truth at
http://www.SFTT.ORG
http://tinyurl.com/csaex
Why We Almost Lost the Submarine
By Raymond Perry
April 13, 2005
Specific details of the investigation into the collision of the USS San
Francisco with a seamount in the Pacific Ocean are beginning to emerge and
they reveal the incident was far more serious than we originally were led to
believe. The
New London Day newspaper published a synopsis of the investigation on
Apr. 9, 2005
(“Navy
Faults Navigational Procedures In Crash Of Sub”),,
that paints a grim picture of what happened to the nuclear attack submarine on
Jan. 8, 2005.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1380422/posts
First, the damage done by the collision was nearly fatal. The article by
reporter Robert Hamilton revealed that the forward bulkhead of the San
Francisco buckled upon impact with the submerged seamount.
Some of the photos of the submarine in drydock show that the deck immediately
aft of the damaged ballast tank area has “bubbled up,” indicating significant
bending of the hull itself. The buckling of the forward bulkhead noted by the
investigation indicates that the ship was on the brink of catastrophic flooding. The
Navy investigation determined that the routine of laying out the navigation plan
for the transit to Australia was seriously deficient. Charts in use were not
updated to indicate a possible hazard just 6,000 yards from the collision
location, and the ship chose to pass within 12 miles of charted pinnacles. The
probe also concluded that the organizational decision-making onboard the San
Francisco was unacceptably “slack” by Pacific Submarine Force standards.
Specific examples include:
With the ship’s fathometer showing that water was shoaling over a period of
time, key crewmembers took no action to verify the safety of continuing on the
planned track.
No attempt was made to verify and resolve the discrepancy in measured versus
charted water depth, despite the fact that some key crewmen thought that the
soundings taken were incorrect since they were taken at high speed.
The chart used for daily navigation was a large-scale map with less detail. This
was convenient for a long and fast voyage but conveyed a false sense of security
when the ship was in fact passing through broken waters.
It appears that the ship was not using a management tool, such as conducting
daily briefs of the next 24 hours of operations, to ensure that all key
crewmembers had considered and discussed future hazards.
An apparently mitigating circumstance was offered in that higher authority
failed to send an operational order (called a “Subnote”) to the submarine until
the night before its departure from Guam. However, this does not tell the full
story. It is rare that a ship is sent out to sea with a subnote “out of the
blue.”
Were the San Francisco’s captain and crew truly ignorant of this pending
voyage?
In a normal sequence of events, the ship itself would initiate the voyage
planning process by submitting a request with a proposed track. Higher authority
would either approve it or propose changes. The submarine would have the
opportunity to negotiate changes in most cases. In any event, such a Subnote
only certifies that the proposed track enjoys freedom from interference with
other submarines or submerged towed bodies. It
is unlikely that there was much mitigating basis in the late receipt of the
final track. In fact, this point seems to have had little sway in affecting 7th
Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert’s decision on Feb. 12 to relieve
San Francisco Commanding Officer Cmdr. Kevin Mooney during Article 15
Admiral’s Mast proceedings
against him for the collision.
So why would a submarine with the fine reputation that this skipper had gained
succumb to such unprofessional performance? The easy answer is to simply pass
this off as “personnel error”, but I feel there is more to the story.
In
the late 1980s and early 1990s Congress passed legislation requiring officers to
be trained for “Joint Duty” assignments. Such training requires specific
education and time spent in joint duty billets – that is, years spent away from
an officer’s chosen specialty.
My own naval experience has confirmed that this significantly reduces an
officer’s available time for professional development in his critical specialty
during the period from the 7th to 15th years of an officer’s overall service. After
the joint duty policies went into effect, it was the initial position of the
Submarine Force that such training would seriously reduce the performance of
Nuclear Trained Submarine Officers. Submarine Force commanders sought an
exemption from the new requirement on grounds that the professions of both
submarining and nuclear engineering were so demanding that they would not be
able to do them justice with the added burden of joint duty.
In a previous article
(“Why
Are Navy COs getting the Ax?”
DefenseWatch,
March 2, 2004), I discussed the demands of joint training and its impact on the
professional development of Commanding Officers in the Navy. Senior
Submarine Force leaders frequently remarked at that time that if they could not
obtain such an exemption then submariners would withdraw from joint duty
altogether. The long-term implications were clear: Ultimately, there would be
few submarine qualified admirals since the law required flag officers to have
been trained for and to have served in qualifying joint billets. But
Congress rebuffed the submariners’ objections and directed “no exemption”.
After a recent spate of submarine mishaps in recent years, the question arises
that the Submarine Force leaders might have erred in not standing their ground. As
a retired career submariner, I believe that the collision and near loss of the
San Francisco is an example of why they should have stood their
ground. To fully understand the impact of joint duty assignments on career
submariners, one must consider Cmdr. Mooney’s career in particular and ask
whether he had had sufficient “time on the pond” to have mastered the difficult
craft of commanding a submarine. The conservatism and skepticism required for an
otherwise good leader to stand back from the day-to-day stresses of running a
nuclear submarine and make tough decisions takes a lot of time at sea – not just
completion of a PCO course.
Only experience gained from years of on-the-job work provides an officer with
the sufficient background, depth of experience and seasoned knowledge to
recognize in advance professional errors that seem small at the time but
ultimately can have a major effect on the ship’s safety.
In
command of a submarine, an officer faces a unique experience: for the first time
in his career there is no one to ask if he has a question. The phone lines
just aren’t long enough. The CO must solve problems himself – alone. No
joint duty assignment can prepare an officer for this. There
is a second potential contributing element to the San Francisco
collision.
The Navy several years ago merged the Quartermaster rating with the Electronics
Technician rating as a means of saving money during a period of personnel
cutbacks. What did the Submarine Force lose in eliminating this professional set
of sailors, and was it worth it?
Another
key element of the San Francisco investigation appears to be that five
key Notices to Mariners were not applied to the specific chart which the
submarine was using to ensure safe passage at the time of the collision.
Updating
charts to ensure all applicable Notices to Mariners have been entered is a
mundane and never ending but truly vital task. To a Quartermaster, it is a key
element of his professional performance.
To an Electronics Technician, it might be, at best, another administrative task. The
chart makers have come in for their round of criticism for not updating the
particular chart used by the submarine. In the world of cartography, there is
never enough money to map the world and recent combat posed many critical and
immediate demands on that community of specialists.
This
chart had been updated five times in recent years, but the Navy probe found that
Mooney’s subordinates did not ensure these updates made it onto the chart, and
thus to the navigation team.
A third factor revealed in the probe is the common and expected practice of
employing dead-reckoning to show if a ship is standing into danger. The practice
is to lay out the ship’s present course and speed for the next few position fix
intervals or four hours in the open ocean (See Chapter 7 of
“The American Practical Navigator”).
This practice presents a visual display of potential danger immediately
available to those navigating the ship, if its course and speed are not
changed. Quartermasters
do this in their sleep as second nature and a core element of their profession.
To an Electronics Technician this too would be another administrative task among
many.
Quartermasters know charts and the potential inaccuracies inherent in a chart
based on information predating satellite mapping of the world (see
“The Navigator’s Paradox,”
DefenseWatch, Feb. 1, 2005). When a Quartermaster sees a series of
soundings indicating a shoaling bottom not shown on the chart, it should, and
does, set off loud warning bells. Electronics
Technicians are professionals too. They work hard in their chosen field. But
each professional field within the Navy operates to different sets of
priorities. When the Submarine Force did away with its Quartermaster rating and
rolled its responsibilities into another rating, some things that were
done instinctively disappeared. I
believe that the performance of key people in the chain of command within the
San Francisco was deficient.
Each of these individuals on board has paid a price for his performance. But
the Submarine Force leadership must also recognize and take responsibility for
larger issues. When the core ethos of a professional organization is challenged
as in the case of the joint duty requirement, leaders must not only recognize
the proposal for what it really does to the organization, but also stand their
ground. Congress’
goal of creating a more perfect officer corps has its down sides. The most
well-trained Joint Qualified Officer is of no value if he cannot get his ship to
the fight, ready to fight on arrival.
Neither does a budget process that is incapable of recognizing when it has
become pennywise and pound-foolish. Whatever savings were taken in doing away
with the Submarine Quartermaster rate have been overrun many times by the cost
of this accident.
The
emerging full picture of the San Francisco accident is even more
disturbing than we initially knew: Reduced “time on the pond” for a commanding
officer and the loss of a set of core skills came together to set the stage for
the near-loss of a submarine and its crew. In
fact, the underwater collision on Jan. 8 will probably result in the premature
retirement of the submarine due to the high estimated costs of repairing it.
As a forward deployed submarine, USS San Francisco was truly valuable in
being permanently stationed within the vast Western Pacific operating area.
USS
San Francisco’s loss to the Submarine Force, the Navy and the nation will be
felt for years.
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Contributed,
YNCS Don Harribine, USN(ret)