Military destiny and madness in
Iran
Since 06-06-06
By Spengler
Jun 6, 2006
http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HF06Ak03.html
Washington expects Iran to accept a package of concessions in return for
abandoning uranium enrichment, for an unsettling reason: American analysts
believe that Iran can accomplish its strategic objectives without nuclear
weapons. In Iraq, pro-Iranian politicians backed by Shi'ite militias already
hold the balance of power. Iranian subsidies to Hamas as well as Iran's control
over Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon ensure that the Islamic Republic will have a
veto over any prospective change in the status of the Palestinian territories.
If the Middle East merely were a chessboard, Iran would accept Washington's
offer in return for demands such as those suggested by Ehsan Ahrari in Asia
Times Online on June 2: security guarantees, acquiescence to an Iranian oil
pipeline to Pakistan and India, and so forth (Tehran wants more than talks).
Rational calculation suggests that Iran is better off taking the US offer (along
with economic incentives from the European Union) and waiting to see who
replaces President George W Bush in January 2009. The next US administration may
be less inclined to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Nonetheless, there will be war, and Washington will strike Iranian nuclear
installations, probably before the end of 2006 (see Why the West will attack
Iran, January 24). Western analysts think President Mahmud Ahmadinejad a madman,
and hope that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will evince more rational behavior.
Reading the Iranian president's Der Spiegel interview last week, in which he
dismissed German indignation over his threat to wipe out Israel as the result of
a "Zionist plot", it is easy to believe that his rug is missing a few knots. But
madness is an occupational hazard of becoming the leader of desperate men
fighting against inevitable ruin. Napoleon Bonaparte, after all, was a lunatic
who thought he was Napoleon.
The tragedy will proceed more or less as follows:
In Washington, the State Department has the cabinet's grudging authorization to
persuade the Iranians to abandon their imperial ambitions peacefully in return
for economic concessions.
In Tehran, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has the government's grudging
authorization to persuade the Americans to concede to Iran a dominant position
in the Persian Gulf without a fight. The Bangalore-educated Mottaki was the
campaign manager for one of Ahmadinejad's opponents in the 2005 presidential
elections and is identified with the supposed moderate Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Both Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Mottaki sincerely
believe that a compromise is in their mutual interest, and have every hope of
reaching such a compromise. Nonetheless they will fail, just as the diplomats of
Europe failed to prevent war in July 1914 despite the near-universal conviction
that war could and should be avoided at all costs.
Iran stands at the precipice of a demographic and economic tailspin. At current
depletion rates Iran no longer will export oil a generation hence, and its
subsidy-heavy economy will fail just as an entire generation of Iranians
retires. By mid-century Iran's demographic profile will resemble the inverted
pyramid of the aging Western countries. For this reason, I have argued before,
Iran has embarked upon imperial expansion (Demographics and Iran's imperial
design, September 13, 2005).
With oil trading in the mid-US$70 range and foreign-currency reserves above $50
billion, though, Iran theoretically could bide its time and wait for
opportunities. Western resolve in the Persian Gulf is failing rapidly, as the
American public repudiates the administration's Quixotic effort to build
democracy in Iraq.
From a game-theoretical standpoint, therefore, Iran could postpone
nuclear-weapons development with little prejudice to its ambitions. When Mahmud
Ahmadinejad threatens to wipe Israel off the map, he is expressing a heartfelt
sentiment rather than a practical policy, for Israel has a nuclear arsenal large
enough to make Persian an extinct language overnight. Mutually assured
destruction is a frightful policy, but it did keep the peace between the United
States and the Soviet Union through 40 years of Cold War, and it is conceivable
at least that a similar uneasy peace might prevail between Iran and Israel.
Iran's main strategic objectives are the Iraqi, the Azerbaijani, and eventually
the Saudi oilfields, but its preferred and most successful methods are
infiltration and subversion through the Shi'ite majorities who inhabit oil-rich
regions on its borders. A collateral objective is to keep pressure on Israel
through Hezbollah in Lebanon, which has sufficient rockets to destroy the Haifa
refineries and other important Israeli targets.
Nuclear weapons, therefore, have little offensive value for Iran at the moment.
To achieve its long-term ambitions, though, Iran cannot do without nuclear
capability. In the event that the United States and its allies (if it still has
any) were to attack Iran to forestall a regional oil grab, nuclear weapons would
be of great use to Iran, either as a way of attacking enemy staging areas, or as
a terrorist device.
If Iran were offered (1) subsidies for civilian nuclear technology, (2) research
capability that kept the nuclear option open for the future, (3) a free hand
among Shi'ites in neighboring countries, (4) endorsement of an oil pipeline to
Pakistan and India, and (5) security guarantees from the United States, the
Iranian government would agree to abandon the enrichment of uranium to weapons
grade, at least for the time being.
Europe happily would make such an offer, for the present generation of Europeans
wants nothing more than to pass away in peace. "Apres moi le deluge!" does not
begin to express Europe's aversion to conflict. But the United States will veto
the concessions that Iran demands unless Iran abandons its Shi'ite
co-religionists in Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere. Indicative was National
Intelligence Director John Negroponte's accusation that Iran remains the world's
leading state sponsor of terrorism. President Ahmadinejad already has boasted of
Iran's ability to hurt Western countries if Iran comes under attack. Iran's
influence among terrorist organizations constitutes a retaliatory weapon against
the Western nations. The United States will not tolerate an agreement that
leaves an Iranian knife at its throat.
But Iran's leverage against the West depends on the Shi'ites' enormous capacity
for self-sacrifice (The blood is the life, Mr Rumsfeld!, October 12, 2005). It
cannot betray allies with whom it has ties of religion as well as blood without
undermining its capacity to deploy such forces in the future. After more than a
millennium the Shi'ite moment in history appears to have come, and no government
can rule the major Shi'ite country without offering a path to victory for its
denominational allies.
That is why it is so hard for Iran to bargain away its nuclear ambitions. As
long as Iran lacks nuclear weapons, the Western powers (as well as Israel) have
the option to scotch its plans at will. Without nuclear capability, Iran must
live under the constant threat of an attack against which it cannot defend.
Ahmadinejad's generation of Iranians, who came to adulthood in the Islamic
Revolution of 1979 and bled for their cause through the terrible Iran-Iraq War
of the 1980s, is determined to secure Iran's greatness for the ages.
If I were running a branch of US military intelligence (let us not speak of that
asylum for unemployable academics, the Central Intelligence Agency), I would
suspend all the game-theory exercises and order the senior staff to read classic
tragedy. It is a fair bet that not a single senior US officer knows the German
national tragedy, namely Friedrich Schiller's 1797 drama on the death of the
Imperial Generalissimo of the Thirty Years' War, Albrecht von Wallenstein
(1583-1634). Despite its theatrical flaws and lapses into sentimentalism,
Schiller's Wallenstein presents an astonishing double portrait of a commander
paralyzed by superstition and an army driven by impossible ambitions.
Wallenstein very nearly became a Napoleon a century and a half before the
Corsican's brief career. He created a new kind of army in the service of the
Catholic cause, composed of adventurers attracted from all of Europe by the
promise of loot and advancement, living off the land with disastrous
consequences for settled populations. Ultimately the Thirty Years' War killed
off half or more of the people of Central Europe. Wallenstein sought a separate
peace with the Protestants that would have left him and his locust-horde as the
arbiter of European power. But he vacillated long enough for the emperor to
divide his forces and arrange his assassination.
Schiller's brilliant portrait of Wallenstein's winter camp reveals an army whose
success also must be its downfall. Its existence is an affront to civil society,
which must find means to expunge it or perish. The secret of Wallenstein's
mysticism and paralysis of will was to be found in the ill-fated character of
his soldiery. They had nowhere to retreat to, and nothing to lose. Jacques
Callot's 1633 prints, Miseries of War, show peasants wreaking horrible vengeance
on discharged soldiers. Wallenstein may have been mad, but his madness was
existential, for the Generalissimos's existence was at odds with the order of
things.
The same is true of the Iranian leadership. Iran has failed as a society in the
face of the modern world. It embodies a fatal combination of modern
demographics, that is, a rapidly aging population, without having assimilated
modern productivity. The forces that have rallied to the banner of the Islamic
Revolution both at home and abroad have no more hope than Wallenstein's
soldiery. Away from their jihad, they can look forward only to a relentless
pulverization of the traditional society whence they came. Such is the stuff of
strategic mysticism. When there is no retreat, nothing to which to return,
Destiny beckons from the enemy's lines and the army leaves its trenches and
flies forward into the cannons.
That is why I do not expect a deal with Iran, despite the best intentions of the
diplomats, and their terrible knowledge of what lies ahead should the West use
force against Iran's nuclear capabilities. What the West euphemistically calls a
"war on terror" is, in fact, a religious war. It must be fought like the Thirty
Years' War. What the West requires, sadly, is not Condoleezza Rice, but a
Cardinal Richelieu.